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The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Price, Volume, and Termination Rate of
Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions
Abstract
Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in 1977. It has since become an important
factor in American firms decision-making in acquiring foreign targets, but its economic impact has gone
largely unexamined. I analyze the influence of the risk of an enforcement action under the FCPA on the
prices of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBMA). In a sample of 13,002 CBMA deals by American
acquirers from 1996-2010, I find statistically significant results, suggesting that firms pay on average 3.9
– 5.1% less to acquire targets in countries with higher risk of attention from the FCPA.
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1.

Introduction

In 1977, Congress enacted the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in response
to the discovery of the widespread use of bribes by US businesses to foreign
government officials (Koehler 2012). Under the FCPA, when a firm acquires
another firm, the acquiring company can be held responsible for any of its
acquisition’s violations of the FCPA since 1977.
In my research, I analyze the possible presence of a “risk premium” in
cross-boarder mergers and acquisitions (CBMA) deals where the target firm is
located in a country that may face closer scrutiny under the FCPA. If the risk of
an FCPA action, and the financial and reputational costs associated with it are
high, an acquiring firm may be willing to pay less for a target firm than if the
target was located in a country that is unlikely to trigger an FCPA enforcement
action. Despite the FCPA’s relevance to acquiring firms, this area of interest has
yet to become a significant area of economic academic research. To my
knowledge, no work exists that specifically evaluates the possible monetary
impact of the FCPA on CBMA, although a working paper presents initial results
that suggest that FCPA enforcement actions are followed by a reduction in the
volume of CBMA activity in the target country (Graham & Stroup, 2014). This
paper attempts to further fill that gap.
I test the hypothesis that the threat of FCPA enforcement leads to lower
prices in CBMA deals by using data on 13,002 cross-border and domestic
mergers and acquisitions deals from 1996-2010 by American acquirers as well as
a data set including information on all FCPA actions since 1977. The results of
the model estimations support the hypothesis that the risk of an FCPA action
negatively affects the price of CBMA deals, implying the presence of a risk
premium.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses background on the
FCPA and CBMA. Section III presents my empirical methodology, and section
IV presents the data used to test my hypothesis. Section V analyzes the results of
the model estimations. Section VI describes additional robustness examinations.
Finally, Section VII contains my conclusions and points for further analysis.
2.

Background & Literature Review

2.1 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
In the wake of investigations after the Watergate scandal, the American public
discovered that American firms routinely participated in bribery while doing
business abroad. In response to the outcry from this discovery, Congress enacted
the FCPA in 1977 to promote a higher ethical standard in global business (Kohler,
2012). The FCPA contains both anti-bribery and record keeping requirements,
therefore the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) both take responsibility for enforcing the FCPA. The antibribery provision of the FCPA “prohibits the corrupt payment of money or
‘anything of value’ to a ‘foreign official’ in order to ‘obtain or retain business’”
(Koehler, 2012). Although the law is now over 35 years old, in recent years, the
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FCPA has seen a significant increase in the number of cases prosecuted. In fact,
more than 64% of the total number of anti-bribery enforcement actions against
publicly traded companies since 1977 has occurred within the last 10 years
(Karpoff et al., 2014).
Early research on the FCPA focused on its impact on the competitiveness of
American businesses (Hines, 1995). However, recently, research surrounding the
FCPA has focused on the determinants and magnitude of FCPA enforcement
actions pursued by the DOJ and SEC. Researchers have identified variables such
as the involvement of foreign actors, defendant’s country of origin, conditions in
the bribe-recipient country, corruption levels, and amount of foreign direct
investment to be influential in the final judgment of an FCPA action beyond
solely the egregiousness of the infraction (Choi & Davis, 2012; McLean, 2012).
2.2 The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Cross-Border Mergers & Acquisitions
For firms, the FCPA has the potential to be an important consideration in their
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBMA) decisions. Under the law, when a
firm acquires another firm, the acquiring company can be held responsible for any
of its acquisition’s violations of the FCPA since 1977. Thus, more rigorous due
diligence in vetting a potential acquisition has become commonplace for firms
looking to avoid the heavy financial and reputational costs of an FCPA action
(Karkoff et al., 2009). CBMA activity has been increasing since the 1990s and in
2007 was valued at USD 4.4 trillion.1 With significant capital at stake, the impact
of FCPA actions deserves consideration in the evaluation of CBMA deals.
Legal researchers have studied how FCPA violations relate to CBMA,
although without attempting to estimate economic relationships. For instance,
Lindsey (2009) provides a summary of FCPA cases. In the Lockheed Martin and
Titan merger case, the revelation of violations of the FCPA during pre-merger
due-diligence eventually led to the termination of the deal. In the case of Latin
Node and eLandia, Latin Node discovered violations of the FCPA by their
acquisition post-merger. They self-reported the case to the DOJ and paid a
criminal fine of $2 million. The high financial and reputational burdens to an
acquiring firm from an inadvertent violation of the FCPA further support the
possible presence of a risk premium in acquiring high risk targets.
3.
Methodology
To model the impact of the risk of an FCPA action on CBMA prices, my main
theoretical model is a relationship of the form:
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = ∝ +𝛽𝐹𝑅 𝑗𝑡 +𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡

(1)

where 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the price of a CBMA deal of the target firm i headquartered in
country j in year t and 𝐹𝑅𝑗𝑡 represents the perceived risk of an FCPA action in

1 Hall,

J., 2007,U.S. Mergers Hit New Record, but Lag Europe, INTLHERALDTRIB.,
www.iht.com/articles/reuters/2007/12/20/business/OUKBSUK-MERGERS-US.php.
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country j in year t. I expect that in countries with a higher risk of a FCPA action,
the price of the deals will be lower to account for the added risk.
Since perceived risk in unobservable, I measure it using a set of related
variables. The main estimating equation is an OLS regression of the form:
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝐴𝑗𝑡 +𝛽2 𝐶𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑋𝑗𝑡 +𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡

(2)

where 𝐹𝐴𝑗𝑡 is a measure of FPCA actions in country j by year t. 𝐶𝑗𝑡 is a measure
of corruption in country j in year t, and I account for additional factors that may
influence CBMA deal prices with the inclusion of variable 𝑋𝑗𝑡 , a vector of macrocountry controls for country j in year t.
The risk of FCPA action is comprised of two components: risk of
prosecution by the DOJ or SEC and actual risk of violating the FCPA. Countries
where the cases of FCPA violations have previously been prosecuted will be
under closer scrutiny by the DOJ and SEC, therefore I include 𝐹𝐴𝑗𝑡 to account for
this added focus. Target firms in countries with higher corruption are at higher
risk of actually violating the FCPA. The addition of the corruption variable thus
accounts for the chance of actually violating the FCPA. Furthermore, economic
research on corruption finds a negative relationship between CBMA prices and
corruption (Weitzel & Burns, 2006).
I first account for variables that influence the decision to pursue FCPA
actions. An FCPA action represents the decision of the DOJ and/or SEC to pursue
an action against a firm, and thus may include decision-making factors beyond
whether a violation occurred. As demonstrated in the research of Choi et al.
(2012) and McClean (2012) the punishment from the DOJ and/or SEC involves
other possible political and economic factors beyond simply the egregiousness of
a crime. For instance, the United States might have political motivations in
discouraging American businesses from moving to China, and thus be more likely
to prosecute FCPA violations by target firms in that country.2 Or, as Choi et al
(2012) suggests, the presence of a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) can
lead to higher prosecution rates and fines because the foreign country is willing to
reveal more information to the United States’ DOJ or SEC during the
investigation. I account for this endogeneity issue in prosecution choice by
including control variables in my equations that cover potential economic and
political factors.
To further control for endogeneity, I control for factors that influence
CBMA decisions. Two main motivations for CBMA are 1) efficiency gains from
attaining economies of scale and 2) strategic gains from improving competitive
positioning (Coeurdacier et al., 2009). Addressing this second point, acquiring
firms may look to emerging markets that offer untapped consumer markets and
high economic growth rates; these same emerging markets may be more corrupt
and more likely to violate the FCPA. I thus include controls that account for
economic market factors.

2

China leads all other nations in number of in FCPA violations within their borders with 30.
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Additionally, trade costs associated with CBMA can impact prices (Hijzen
et al., 2006; Shimizu et al., 2004). Cultural and geographic differences make
successful CBMAs more difficult because firms must overcome language,
cultural, and physical barriers in addition to the already difficult process of
merging the personnel and functions of two unique firms. I thus include trade cost
factors in my controls.
4.
Data
Table I reports descriptions, units, and source of all data. CBMA data comes from
Bloomberg and includes 13,002 domestic and cross-border mergers and
acquisition deals announced between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2010
with a U.S. based acquirer to 133 target countries. The deal prices will be
represented by the listed announced total deal values. In my regressions, I use log
of announced total deal values. I index announced total values into current US
dollars using the consumer price index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
A review of the CBMA data reveals several deals that involve multiple
target countries, and in order to isolate the impact of the FCPA risk and country
factors, I remove these 63 deals from the data set. Additionally, I drop deals with
announced total deal values of zero. When investigated, some of these deals
possess actual deal values not equal to zero and others’ actual deal values remain
undisclosed. In order to remain consistent, I remove these deals. Finally, I drop
deals with missing announced deal values. I also drop deals that occurred in
territories and dependencies such as the British Virgin Islands and Guernsey. This
leaves me with a sample of 6902 deals for my estimations.
To measure FCPA risk, I use data on FCPA actions since 1977 used in
Graham and Stroup (2014) and assembled from the DOJ/SEC case releases. It
includes 256 actions in 69 countries. The FCPA variable was added as a count
variable totaling all FCPA actions in the country up to the year of the deal.
To measure corruption, I employ the Control of Corruption Indicator
(CCI) compiled by the World Bank. The index covers the years 1996-2010 and
includes indicators for 214 countries. The CCI index is scaled from -2.5 to 2.5
with 2.5 being the strongest control of corruption and -2.5 the lowest.
As described in the previous section, to control for country-level
variations that may impact FCPA enforcement and CBMA prices, I include
variables to cover economic conditions and trade costs. Economic indicators
tested include Growth Rate per year from the World Bank and Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), GDP per capita, and population from the gravity data set of the
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII). I account
for possible trade costs with geographic, cultural, and political closeness
measures. Geographic distance is measured by time difference between the US
and the target country from the CEPII gravity data set. I approximate cultural
closeness with the common legal structure and common language gravity
variables from CEPII.
Finally, I use proxies for degree of political alignment including
membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) from the
gravity dataset from CEPII, Mutual Legal Assistant Treaties (MLAT) with the
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United States, which I compile by hand from lists of treaties on the Library of
Congress’ THOMAS website, and a presence of a Regional Trade Agreements
(RTA) with the United States, which I also compile by hand from the World
Trade Organization’s list of regional trade agreements. In line with Choi et al.
(2012), I predict that the presence of a MLAT will result in an increase in the risk
premium for firms. The presence of a GATT or an RTA should result in increased
prices because they reduce other trade barriers making targets in member
countries more attraction.
5.
Empirical Results
Table II presents the results from the estimation of equation (2). Column (1)
reports estimations of the equation without additional controls and Column (2)
adds year fixed-effects. The coefficient of interest for FCPA is negative and
significant as hypothesized. Column (3) and (4) add the controls described in
Section III. Column (3) uses Common Official Language to proxy for the trade
cost of cultural closeness and Column (4) uses Common Legal Origin. The
coefficient of FCPA remains negative and significant. Based on the regressions
including controls, the magnitude of the coefficient suggests that for each added
action in a target country, and thus added risk of prosecution, the announced price
of the deal will be on average 3.9 - 5.1% less. The reported prices are only for
deals that were completed. Deals that did not go through because they were
deemed too risky are not represented in the data. The omission of these data
points bias the results downward because they would have represented deals with
higher risk premiums and thus lower prices. The coefficient on the Control of
Corruption Indicator is positive and significant, confirming the results of Weizel
& Burns (2006). Countries with a better Control of Corruption see higher deal
prices on average.
Consistent with the proposed motivations for strategic gains through CBMA
described by Coeurdacier et al., (2009), GDP has a significant positive
coefficient; consistent with the theory the firms use CBMA to gain market share
in thriving markets. The coefficient of GDP Growth Rate is negative but
insignificant possibly suggesting that firms will pay less to acquire firms in
emerging markets with high growth but also high investment risk.
Time Difference, which accounts for trade costs associated with geographic
distance, has a significant positive coefficient. This is in contrast to the trade cost
theory presented by Hijzen et al. (2006) and Shimizu et al. (2004). When taking
the log of time difference to account for this possible distribution, the coefficient
of time difference remains positive but is no longer significant. This regression is
not shown.
Also contrary to trade cost theory, the proxies for cultural closeness,
common legal origin and common official language are both negative although
only having a common legal origin is significant. Finally, none of the proxies for
political closeness, MLAT, RTA, or GATT membership, are significant. These
variables are also highly correlated, so I only include the MLAT variable. This
variable coefficient has a negative sign, corresponding with the research in Choi
et al. (2012).
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I use clustered errors grouped by country in my estimation. I have a
clustering issue in my regression estimation since I examine CBMA using data at
the firm level and my explanatory variables only use country level data. Target
firms may display within country correlations that would not be accounted for in
my current model. By adding clustered errors, I account for the group-level error
component.
6.

Additional Examinations

6.1 Termination Rate
6.1.1 Background and Model
In 2003, Lockheed Martin & Titan announced that they would merge, however,
revelation of violations of the FCPA by Titan during post-announcement due
diligence resulted in the termination of the merger. Based on the case of
Lockheed Martin & Titan, I investigate whether a higher risk of FCPA action
impacts the likelihood of an announced deal terminating before its completion.
To test the effect of FCPA action risk on termination rate, I use a Probit
model:
𝑃(𝑇)𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝐴𝑗𝑡 +𝛽2 𝐶𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑋𝑗𝑡 +𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡

(3)

where 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 takes on a unit value if the deal of target firm i located in country j in
year t is terminated after the announcement, 𝐹𝐴𝑗𝑡 is a measure FPCA action risk
in country j in year t. 𝐶𝑗𝑡 is a measure of actual corruption in country j in year t,
and 𝑋𝑗𝑡 is a vector of macro-country controls for country j in year t. FCPA risk
factors should positively correlate with terminated deals.
With a Probit model, clustered errors are not possible, so to add validation
I also run an OLS regression of the form:
𝑇𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝐴𝑗𝑡 +𝛽2 𝐶𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑋𝑗𝑡 +𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡

(4)

where 𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the termination rate of deals in country j in year t.
6.1.2 Results
Table III shows results for equations (3) and (4). Column (1) reports the Probit
estimation without controls, and Column (2) adds controls. Column (3) reports the
OLS estimation without controls, and Column (4) adds controls. Examining the
Probit regression, when controls are added, the estimated FCPA coefficient is
negative. This is in contrast to my expectations that an increased risk of FCPA
violation will lead to a higher chance of termination. However, the estimated
coefficient is insignificant. The Control of Corruption estimated coefficient is
positive as hypothesized although it is also insignificant. The OLS estimation
showcases similar relationships in the coefficients.
GDP Growth Rate has a significant positive estimated coefficient
suggesting that deals in target countries with higher growth, usually more volatile

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol12/iss1/13

6

Duncombe: The FCPA and Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions

markets, are more likely to be terminated after the announcement. This estimated
coefficient becomes insignificant in OLS, but holds the same relationship.
In support of trade cost theory, common official language has a positive
estimated coefficient in both the Probit and OLS estimations although it is only
significant with OLS. Contrary to trade cost theory, geographic distance, as
measured by time difference, has a significant negative estimated coefficient
suggesting that deals between firms that are further apart are less likely to be
terminated. OLS shows a similar relationship between distance and termination.
In these cases more rigorous pre-merger diligence may be done to address
compatibility. Or, geographic closeness could mean that the acquirer discovers
more information about the target firm post-announcement that results in a
termination of the deal. The MLAT variable is insignificant in both models.
6.2 Industry Impacts
6.2.1 Background and Model
Hijzen et al. (2006) distinguish empirically between horizontal (firms in the same
industries) and vertical (firms in different industries) deal prices. Their research
suggests the need to examine the impact of firm and industry characteristics on
CBMA prices. To test this theory, my new model specification adopts equation
(2) and adds firm characteristics and industry variables:
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝐴𝑗𝑡 +𝛽2 𝐶𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑋𝑗𝑡 +𝛽4 𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡

(5)

where 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the price of a deal of target firm i located in country j in year t,
𝐹𝐴𝑗𝑡 is a measure FPCA action risk in country j in year t. 𝐶𝑗𝑡 is a measure of
actual corruption in country j in year t, and 𝑋𝑗𝑡 is a vector of macro-country
controls for country j in year. 𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents firm characteristics of acquirer and
target firms in deal i of with the target located in country j in year t. 𝐼𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents
the industry of the target and acquirer firm in deal i with the target located in
country j in year t.
To control for firm characteristics, I include a variable of target firm size;
larger targets will command higher prices. Data on firm characteristics comes
from Bloomberg. I use log of acquirer and target total assets and log of acquirer
and target number of employees to control for firm size. I index announced total
values, acquirer total assets, and target total assets data into current dollars using
the consumer price index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
I include industry data in two ways. First, I control for horizontal deals
(acquirer and vertical deals as suggested by Hijzen et al. (2006). I expect
horizontal deals to correlate with higher prices because more knowledge of the
industry leads to less risk and a higher chance of success. Second, I group deals
by interaction level of the target firm industry with government. Industries with a
high-level of government interaction present a higher risk for FCPA violations
than medium and low chance of interaction industries because these businesses
may have a higher necessity for bribery to successfully carry out their business.
Based on industry data from Bloomberg, I categorize industries with a high
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chance of interaction industry sectors to include basic materials, energy,
Government, and utilities. Under a medium chance of interaction industry sectors
are communications, financial, and funds. Finally, I categorize low chances of
government interaction industries as consumer, cyclical and non-cyclical,
industrial, and technology sectors.
6.2.2 Results
Table IV shows results for equation (5). Column (1) reports estimates for the
controls used in my main regression. Column (2) adds a dummy if the target and
acquiring firm are in the same industry. Column (3) adds dummies for level of
government interaction. Column (4) includes controls for target size. Column (5)
includes all industry controls.
The estimated coefficient for FCPA actions is negative for all regressions
although it loses significance with the addition of target size controls. The
estimated coefficient of Control of Corruption remains positive but loses
significance with the addition of industry variables.
When added to the main regression equation individually, all industry
controls have significant estimated coefficients. The estimated coefficient for
horizontal deals is positive supporting the research of Hijzen et al. (2006). The
estimated coefficients for target firm size controls are both significant and
positive supporting the hypothesis that larger firms attract higher prices. These
coefficients remain significant when all industry controls are added to the model.
The high and medium government interaction dummies both have positive
estimated coefficients. This may suggest that acquirers are willing to pay more for
firms that already interact with government in order to navigate more complicated
bureaucracies, which may also include navigating corruption.
The other controls remain consistent with the main estimated equation;
however with the addition of target size controls the sign of GDP’s estimated
coefficient changes and becomes insignificant.
6.3 Governance
6.3.1 Background and Model
Rossi & Volpin (2004) demonstrate a positive relationship between CBMA and
governance factors such as accounting standards. Based on their research, it
makes sense to account for governance in my regressions. However, corruption is
a component of governance; countries with better governance can also expect
lower corruption levels. Therefore, I don’t include both variables in my main
regression. I thus create a separate model to test influence of governance on the
prices of CBMA:
𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝐴𝑗𝑡 +𝛽2 𝐺𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑋𝑗𝑡 +𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡

(6)

where 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the price of the deal with target firm i located in country j in year t,
𝐹𝐴𝑗𝑡 is a measure FPCA action risk in country j in year t. 𝐺𝑗𝑡 is a measure of
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Governance in country j in year t, and 𝑋𝑗𝑡 is a vector of macro-country controls
for country j in year t.
Graham & Stroup (2014) use the World Bank’s Government Effectiveness
Indicator (GEI) as their proxy for corruption, and based on their research I also
use the GEI as a proxy for governance. The index covers the years 1996-2010 and
includes indicators for 215 countries. The GEI is on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5 with 2.5 being the poorest governance and 2.5 being the strongest. The CCI and GEI
have a very high correlation further demonstrating the necessity of evaluating
each component separately.
6.3.2 Results
Table V shows results for the estimation of equation (6). As in the estimation of
the main equation (2), Column (1) reports estimations of the equation without
controls and Column (2) adds year fixed effects. The coefficient of interest for
FCPA is negative and significant as hypothesizes. Column (3) and (4) add the
controls described in Section III. Column (3) uses Common Official Language to
proxy for the trade cost of cultural closeness and Column (4) uses Common Legal
Origin. Examining, Column 4, the coefficient of FCPA actions remains negative
and significant. The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that for each added
action in a target country, and thus added risk of prosecution, the announced price
of the deal will be on average 5.57% less.
The estimated coefficient for governance is positive and significant, matching
the result of the control of corruption proxy in the estimation of equation (2). The
coefficients also have similar magnitudes although those for governance are
slightly lower when controls are added. The sign and significance of the controls
also match those in the estimation of equation (2). I again use clustered errors
grouped by country in my estimation.
7.
Conclusion
This research paper attempted to analyze the impact of the risk of FCPA
enforcement on CBMA prices and termination rates. The OLS estimation
techniques employed in my main analysis reveal a clear negative impact of FCPA
risk on deal value and support my initial hypothesis that firms pay lower prices,
up to 5.1% less, in deals with a higher risk of eventual FCPA enforcement action
in order to negate this risk.
Legal researchers have focused on the impact of the FCPA on firms in
CBMA deals, but this article represents the first attempt to quantify these impacts.
The presence of a possible risk premium in CBMA deals with a higher threat of
violating the FCPA offers a first step in examining the law’s influence on US
firms. Further examinations could continue to examine the role of a firm’s
industry in interactions with the FCPA. This research is limited by its examination
deals with a United States based acquirer. FCPA actions have been filed against
foreign firms as well, and an expansion of the study could highlight if a risk
premium applies to these foreign firms. The FCPA was created to set a standard
in global business; so foreign firms would also have to be examined to truly
evaluate the success of its mission.
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Tables
Table I: List of Data Descriptions and Sources
Variable

Description

Source

Main Regression
Deal Value
FCPA Actions

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol12/iss1/13

Logged, millions of USD, adjusted
for inflation
Count for every FCPA action in
country up to and including that year

Bloomberg
Graham et al.
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Control of Corruption
Population

Scale from -2.5 (low control) to 2.5
(high control)
Of target country, in millions

World Bank [1]
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et
d'Informations Internationales
(CEPII) [2]
CEPII [2]

Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

Of target country, in current million
USD

GDP per capita

Of target country, in current USD

CEPII [2]

GDP Growth Rate

Of targer country, percentage

World Bank [3]

Time Difference

Time in target – time in acquirer

CEPII [2]

General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs (GATT) Membership
Regional Trade Agreement w/US

1=GATT/WTO membership

CEPII [2]

1=membership

Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty

1=presence of treaty

World Trade Organization (WTO)
[4]
Library of Congress THOMAS [5]

Common Official Language

1=common official or primary
language
1=common legal origins

Common Legal Origins

CEPII [2]
CEPII [2]

Alternative Regressions
Termination Rate

Bloomberg

Acquirer Number of Employees

= Terminated deals in target country
over total deals in target country (%)
1=lowest quartile of Government
Effectiveness
Standard units

Target Number of Employees

Standard units

Bloomberg

Acquirer Total Assets

Millions of USD, adjusted for CPI

Bloomberg

Target Total Assets

Millions of USD, adjusted for CPI

Bloomberg

Government Effectiveness

High Interaction with Government
Industry

Target Firm in basic materials,
government, utilities, or energy
sectors
Medium Interaction with
Target Firm in communications,
Government Industry
financial, or funds sectors
Low Interaction with Government
Target Firm in consumer, cyclical
Industry
and non-cyclical, industrial, or
technology sectors
Same Industry
1 = Target and Acquirer firms in
same industry sector
Footnotes: [1] http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
[2] http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=8
[3] http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG
[5] http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicMaintainRTAHome.aspx
[6] http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php

World Bank [1]
Bloomberg

Bloomberg

Bloomberg
Bloomberg

Bloomberg

Table II: OLS of CBMA Deal Price on FCPA Risk with Corruption Proxy
The table reports estimates of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the Log of Price
of CBMA deal of target firm i in country j in year t. The variable of interest is FCPA risk
measured by FCPA actions in country j’s by year t and Control of Corruption (CCI) in country j
in year t (Column (1)). In Column (2), I add year fixed effects. In Column (3) and (4) I add the
control variables described in Section III, I control for Corruption, Target Country Market
Potential, and Trade Costs. Clustered standard errors appear in parentheses beneath the
coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
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levels, respectively.

VARIABLES
FCPA
CCI

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.0431***
(0.00826)
0.211*
(0.114)

-0.0385***
(0.00807)
0.230**
(0.116)

-0.0391**
(0.0186)
0.277***
(0.0953)
-0.0397
(0.0465)
0.100*
(0.0541)
0.0693**
(0.0306)
-0.175
(0.137)
-0.00218
(0.136)

-0.0507***
(0.0185)
0.285***
(0.0902)
-0.0159
(0.0436)
0.131**
(0.0533)
0.0548
(0.0348)

GDP Growth Rate
Log GDP
Time Difference
Common Official
Language
Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty
Common legal
Origin

-0.0398
(0.158)
-0.307*
(0.170)

Observations
R-squared
Year FE
Adj R2

5,941
0.034
no
0.0333

5,941
0.056
yes
0.0541

3,693
0.074
yes
0.0705

3,693
0.075
yes
0.0715

Table III: Probit Model of Termination on FCPA Risk
The table reports estimates of Probit regressions where the dependent variable is an indicator
variable for the termination of CBMA deal of firm i in country j in year t taking a value of one if
a deal was terminated after the announcement and zero otherwise. The variable of interest is
FCPA risk measured by FCPA actions in country j’s by year t and Control of Corruption in
country j in year t (Column (1)). In Column (2), I add the control variables described in Section
III, I control for FCPA action factors, Target Country Market Potential, and Trade Costs. In
Column (3) and (4), I run the same regressions listed above using an OLS estimation technique
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with year fixed effects. Robust standard errors appear in parentheses beneath the coefficient
estimates for Column (1) and (2) and clustered standard errors for (3) and (4). *, **, and ***
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

VARIABLES
FCPA
Corruption

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.00449
(0.00600)
0.0141
(0.0476)

-0.00367
(0.0116)
0.0710
(0.0756)
0.0421*
(0.0218)
-0.0625
(0.0442)
-0.0404**
(0.0188)
0.0427

0.000260
(0.000459)
0.00207
(0.00568)

0.000672
(0.000886)
0.00488
(0.00589)
0.00204
(0.00204)
-0.00435
(0.00272)
-0.00385***
(0.000962)
0.0130**

GDP Growth Rate
Log GDP
Time Difference
Common Official
Language

(0.187)
-0.154
(0.147)

Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty
Observations
R-squared
Year FE
Adj R2

11,576

6,815

no

no

(0.00628)
0.00206
(0.00683)
11,576
0.007
yes
0.00539

6,815
0.013
yes
0.0107

Table IV: OLS Regression CBMA Price on FCPA with Industry Controls
The table reports estimates of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the Log of Price
of CBMA deal of target firm i in country j in year t. The variable of interest is FCPA risk
measured by FCPA actions in country j’s by year t and Corruption in country j in year t. In
Column (1), I add the control variables described in Section III, I control for Target Country
Market Potential, and Trade Costs. In Column (2), I add a dummy for horizontal deals. In
Column (3), I add Industry Risk dummies. In Column (4), I add Target Size controls. In Column
(5), I include all Industry controls. I add year fixed effects in all regressions. Robust standard
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errors appear in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

VARIABLES
FCPA
Corruption
GDP Growth
Rate
Log GDP
Time Difference
Common Official
Language
Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty
High Risk
Industry

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.0391**
(0.0186)
0.277***
(0.0953)
-0.0397

-0.0490***
(0.0162)
0.142
(0.0927)
-0.0335

-0.0491***
(0.0166)
0.154
(0.0978)
-0.0412

-0.0696
(0.0624)
0.113
(0.184)
-0.0507

-0.0535
(0.0669)
0.00403
(0.229)
-0.0920

(0.0465)
0.100*
(0.0541)
0.0693**
(0.0306)
-0.175
(0.137)
-0.00218
(0.136)

(0.0383)
0.107**
(0.0504)
0.0585***
(0.0192)
-0.00578
(0.134)
-0.0329
(0.135)

(0.0402)
0.108**
(0.0522)
0.0683***
(0.0201)
-0.0576
(0.137)
-0.0523
(0.140)
0.746***

(0.0793)
-0.121
(0.0881)
0.0137
(0.0414)
0.327
(0.231)
0.148
(0.247)

(0.106)
-0.153
(0.125)
-0.0253
(0.0532)
0.339
(0.304)
0.337
(0.288)
0.424

(0.154)
0.227*
(0.124)

Medium Risk
Industry
Horizontal Deal

372
0.470
yes
0.446

274
0.483
yes
0.445

0.545***
(0.104)

Log Target Total
Assets
Log Target No.
of Employees
Observations
R-squared
Year FE
Adj R2

0.542***
(0.0783)
0.118*
(0.0693)

(0.380)
-0.0525
(0.256)
0.198
(0.223)
0.469***
(0.0847)
0.142*
(0.0800)

3,693
0.074
yes
0.0705

2,046
0.099
yes
0.0923

1,979
0.100
yes
0.0931

Table V: OLS of Price on FCPA Risk with Governance Proxy
The table reports estimates of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the Log of Price
of CBMA deal of target firm i in country j in year t. The variable of interest is FCPA risk
measured by FCPA actions in country j’s by year t and Governance in country j in year t
(Column (1)). In Column (2), I add year fixed effects. In Column (3) and (4) I add the control
variables described in Section III, I control for Target Country Market Potential, and Trade
Costs. Clustered standard errors appear in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates. *, **,
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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VARIABLES
FCPA
Governance

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.0443***
(0.00680)
0.271**
(0.136)

-0.0423***
(0.00666)
0.254*
(0.132)

-0.0462**
(0.0178)
0.218*
(0.116)
-0.0491
(0.0421)
0.113*
(0.0578)
0.0718**
(0.0299)
-0.101
(0.147)

-0.0557***
(0.0175)
0.232**
(0.111)
-0.0281
(0.0404)
0.133**
(0.0540)
0.0602*
(0.0343)

GDP Growth Rate
Log GDP
Time Difference
Common Official
Language
Common legal
Origin

-0.236

Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaty

Observations
R-squared
Year FE
Adj R2
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5,941
0.034
no
0.0335

5,941
0.055
yes
0.0533

-0.0167
(0.132)

(0.189)
-0.0300
(0.151)

3,693
0.072
yes
0.0682

3,693
0.072
yes
0.0689
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